Rabbi Harold M. Schulweis Sermons

The critics of Mordecai Kaplan's philosophic efforts were persistent in their accusations of his purported neglect of metaphysics. Of what value is "an account of the psychological and ethical consequences" of affirming a theology without the metaphysical substructure which deals with "things as a whole" and without the belief that there is "something ontological, some affirmation...concerning the ultimate nature of things" ?  A theology that does not offer God as "the only tenable explanation of the universe,"¹ and that does not deal with the problems of theodicy, sin, resurrection, and proofs for the existence and attributes of the Deity, is no theology at all.

The task of this article is to analyze Kaplan's "soterics" as a metaphysical theology. Not that his metaphysical analysis concerns itself with being qua being, nor with speculation over ultimate or first principles, nor with the traditional schoolman's preoccupation with the transcendental nature of God, freedom and immortality. But in his theory of salvation, we confront an empirical metaphysics, a philosophic anthropology that searches for the pervasive traits of the natural world and of human nature. Upon these concepts of maximum generality, Kaplan constructed an ethics and theology. The root metaphors of Kaplan's metaphysics are biological and organic, not mechanistic or discrete; its method, scientific; its conclusions, probabilistic, heuristic, in principle verifiable. His metaphysics stresses growth, creativity, process; his theology is naturalistically and humanistically oriented.

Before analyzing Kaplan's soterical approach, it must be set in historical perspective. It arose as a response to the insolubility of the traditional problem inherent in positing the existence and character of a supernatural God. The problem may be stated thus: if there exists an antecedent Being, wholly independent of human beings of whom no spatio-temporal attributes may be legitimately predicated, and whose nature lies outside the realm of human experience, in what sense can such a Reality be said to be known by human persons, or be meaningful to them? The very incomprehensibleness, in human terms, of such a supernatural God denies the conditions for its confirmation or rejection. The supernaturalist's claim turns impregnable not by virtue of its irresistible logic but because of its "logically meaningless" formulation. The religious naturalist enters the scene unable to accept a supernatural God on faith. Like Kaplan, he may hold at least one unverifiable presupposition. But while his assumptions are heuristic principles or hypotheses, subject at all times to questions and rejection should they prove unworkable or fruitless, the claims of orthodox theologians have actual ontological references, in which the Being referred to is given absolute existential status not subject to doubt. The religious naturalist is convinced that the source of the meaningful attributes of God is discovered through experiences between human beings and between the rest of the natural world, experiences which are often the same but can vary from group to group and from place to place. In the very search of mankind for God, the religious naturalist seeks his clues as to the nature of the divine itself. He may come to know that when men claim to have experienced a revelation of a supernatural Being, they often confuse the reality of the experience with the experience of Reality. He may come to know that "the Ethiopians make their gods black and snub-nosed, while the Thracians give theirs red hair and blue eyes" (Xenophanes); but he dismisses none of these. For the religious naturalist also knows that the process of reifying man's characteristics, values and ideals reveals its sancta, aspiration levels, success criteria, and ethical rationale.

Kaplan's theological approach was based on the conviction that "by shifting the orientation from the God-concept, a point intended to be outside human experience, to the idea of man, we are likely to make more headway with the problem of salvation."² To cite Feuerbach, "If we are to understand religion, we must take as subject what has been taken for predicate and vice-versa."January 3, 2011 The human being as an "animal symbolicum" pictures God and therein enters the world of possibility, oughts and should-be. In worship, he extols those elements which better his life and seeks strength to eliminate the evils which plague it. In his struggle to find himself through this symbolic dimension, he can become more truly human and, thereby, appreciate the divinity in and between him and the world.

The truly revolutionary character of Kaplan's soterical approach, however, is not in this general application of his naturalism, but in his humanistic interpretation of personal salvation. The quest for divinity in the world at large entails discovery within oneself of that which will better his personal life. "From out of my depths, I call unto Divinity." Only to the extent to which one consciously realizes every humanizing potentiality in himself and others, will he attain a measure of personal salvation and an experience and understanding of Godliness. Kaplan's soterics is the study of the nature and method of achieving this end. Soterics and the Growth Imperative

It is Kaplan's belief that soterics can be a framework for salvation for all people regardless of varying personal viewpoints, because it is based on two elemental and compulsory factors in human nature itself: the will to live, and its corollary the will to maximum life. The latter, the principle of self-realization is centered in the development of the productive personality of the self on every level:

a. On the level of vitalities, the self is an organism of biogenic needs (hunger, sex, etc.) and socio-genic needs (the socially acquired needs such as belonging to a group, having status). The ascetic, other-worldly philosophies that deny these primary and secondary needs are, from the point of view of soterics, inimical to healthful growth and salvation.

b. On the level of reason and intelligence, the self functions as a mediator of conflicting interests in order to harmonize and channelize the variety of experiences impinging on it. Like the Aristotelian "mean" and the Platonic "sense of justice," the rational exercise allows each impulse a measure of gratification consistent with the total welfare. It is the crucial instrument recognizing the innate potentialities of the self and its enlargement.

c. On the level of morality, the self is said to "harbor the values of the spirit of holiness," "the kingdom of ends."⁴ On this level, courage supplies the emotive charge that transforms man's ethical, intellectual commitments into action. The dramatization of the search for self-actualization is celebrated through ritual and prayer; and the realm of purposes is recognized, articulated and made conscious.

Soterics is a this-worldly "normative science of human life in all its aspects, from the standpoint of verifiable experience."⁵ It is a form of art in which the diverse levels of human living, as described above, are integrated and each dimension given its weight according to the desired goal of the total health, happiness and creativity of the individual. The religious personality is conceived as an artist molding his self into the highest form, impelled by the soteric imperative, as described by Plotinus: "Withdraw into your self and look. And if you do not find yourself beautiful yet, act as does the creator of a statue that is to be made beautiful; he cuts away here, he smooths there, he makes this line lighter, this other purer, until a lovely face has grown upon his work. So do you also: cut away all that is excessive, straighten all that is crooked, bring light to all that is overcast, labor to make all one glow of beauty, and never cease carving your statue until there shall shine out on you from it the godly splendor of virtue, until you shall see the perfect goodness established in the stainless shrine."⁶

In his conception of salvation as the attainment of the maximum good through the development of the inherent possibilities or potentialities of the organism, Kaplan has been more influenced by the contributions of recent psychiatry than by the romantic, idealistic metaphysics of self-realization. An increasing number of philosophically oriented psychologists such as Fromm, Horney, Sullivan, Goldstein, have leaned heavily on the urge in man to self-realization in order to justify the goal and direction of their therapy. They appear to be as concerned with the re- education of the individual personality towards this end as with treatment aimed at simple adjustment to existing condition.

Kurt Goldstein, a psychiatric pathologist, refers to the observation that "an organism is governed by the tendency to actualize as much as possible the individual capacities," and argues that this tendency is "the only drive by which the life of the organism is determined.⁷ Karen Horney concurs: "Man, by his very nature and of his own accord, strives toward self- realization,....and his set of values evolves from such striving."⁸ Erich Fromm articulates the same concept when he states the aim of psychiatric therapy to be "the optimal development of a person's potentialities and the realization of his individuality"⁹ his justification being the belief that "all organisms have an inherent tendency to actualize their specific potentialities."¹⁰

The relationship between health and salvation (i.e. self- realization) is not entirely new in religious philosophy. It is no mere etymological accident that the term salvation in so many languages is integrally related to the idea of healing.¹¹ The central idea of salvation is "making whole," a "re-establishment of a whole thing that was broken, disrupted, disintegrated."¹² This has been given a naturalistic cast in Kaplan's soterics. The integrated development of the self-productive personality is understood in religious terms as the quintessential ingredient in spiritual growth and the realization of the divine principle in man.

At this point, certain questions may be raised: First, if the realization of "maximum life" is inherent in the nature of man, why the need for Kaplan's "soterical imperative" to bring it about? Why recommend any action in accordance with human nature, since it is apparently that which no one can avoid doing? The answer may lie in understanding that the drive for maximum life or self-realization is a generalized one inherent in human nature, but it comprises many specific levels of activity on the part of the self which requires mediation. Self-consciousness and the use of reason are necessary for at least two reasons: to learn the best and surest way to satisfy specific impulses and to learn how to integrate the demands of any one impulse to the total welfare of the organism at any given time. Thus, for Kaplan, the degree to which the individual can succeed in attaining his salvation depends upon the extent to which he has both sensitivity and self-awareness. The need to possess these traits is what persuades Kaplan to call for the "artistic dimension" in man to achieve his measure of the divine.

Second, is the concept of self-realization too ambiguous to be of value as a basis for soterics? Whether one acts one way or the other, some natural capacity will be realized. For the goal of actualizing all the latent capacities of man, no methodological directive is offered so as to judge conflicting directions of fulfillment. As Henry Sidgwick, commenting on the self-realization theories of Green and Spencer, put it: "The sinner realizes capabilities, in this broad sense (of self-realization) as much as the saint."¹³

In answer it should be said that the concept of maximum life of self-realization is not the sole characteristic of man, but rather represents that which is essentially human in man's nature. Salvation does not depend on the fulfillment of any and every impulse indiscriminately, but the fulfillment of the potential of an organism in such a healthful fashion as will aid the individual in achieving the maximum good. How this maximum good is defined will depend on the individual's culture and its institutions at any given state. In a complex society such as ours, where differing criteria of self-realization co-exist, the problem of choosing from particular modes of behavior is aggravated. Horney and Fromm, for example, invoke "creativity," "spontaneity" or "productivity" as standards to distinguish behavior leading to healthy development from behavior leading to stagnant or self-destructive conditions. Unfortunately, these concepts (creativity, etc.) are in turn defined as that which is self-fulfilling or that which leads to further growth and development. Clearly the argument is circular, and the need for clearly-defined criteria is not obviated. The proponents of the self-realization theory seem to have a pragmatic solution to this problem, implying experimentation and trial and error. While the positive characterization and criteria of self-realization remain ambiguous, the negative aspects (ill-health, anxiety phenomena, etc.) are more precise. Where self-realization is not in the direction of general health and well-being, the organism will manifest symptoms of disorder. Be it a subjective report of unhappiness, or a specialist's diagnosis of neurotic traits, or the appearance of psychosomatic ills, something will raise a red flag. Whether growth is healthful or inimical, therefore, is not a matter of caprice, but is rooted in the constitutive demands of the organism.

Further, there are curative powers in the organism, such that, when the proper corrective directives are applied by oneself or a specialist, the organism will respond with well-being. Karen Horney points to "curative forces inherent in the mind as well as the body, and that in cases of disorder of body of mind, the physician merely gives a helping hand to remove the harmful and to support the healing forces."¹⁴ In the language of Kaplan, the "psychoanalyst and the artist have in common the giving of new form to what is, by identifying what is and eliciting from it that which can and ought to be."¹⁵ Yet even if we establish a degree of internal consistency in the theory of self-realization, the existence of an urge to self-realization is far from being accepted as a verified datum by the entire scientific world. The consequences of this doubtful status for soterics will be further discussed dealing with the more fundamental principle, the will to live.

THE WILL TO LIVE

If the self-realization principle of soterics is characteristic of the distinctively human species, it may be said that the will to live it common to all living forms. The nature of this Spinozistic "endeavor to preserve one's own beings," however, is not clear. Examples of its manifestations offered by Kaplan lead one to assume that it is intended by him as an empirical datum. "The healing of a wound, whether in a tree or in a living being, is a manifestation of an organic urge."¹⁶ Since it is innate and, in its original form, "not meant to be conceived of as a conscious purpose of living beings,"¹⁷ it would appear in human beings as a generalized instinct, a complex, purposeful, motivating force, "a faculty of acting in such a way as to produce certain ends without previous education in their performance."¹⁸

Kaplan would ground both the will to live and the will to examine life (self-realization) in human nature, in the organism itself. These data are intended to serve as a reliable, generic base for a normative universe of discourse among all mankind, regardless of the differing forms of specific societies. Thus, while given societies would supply varying norms in the achievement of salvation, the entire world would still be in a position to judge their efficacy.

As for the self-realization principle, agreement to the existence of a general self-preservative urge in organisms is far from settled in psychological literature. Fromm may state that "the desire to live is inherent in every organism and man cannot help wanting to live regardless of what he would like to think about."¹⁹ But another eminent psychologist, Menninger, argues that "the best theory to account for all the presently know facts is Freud's hypothesis of a death instinct."²⁰ And Muzafer Sherif writes what might apply to both the preceding: "Such dramatic-sounding instincts as the instincts of death and destruction cannot be subjected to the check of controlled investigation."²¹ Therefore, from an empirical point of view, considerable doubt is cast upon the urge to self-preservation as the grounds for normative unity. The difficulty with this self- preservation urge lies in making it a generalized designation of reactions to specifically bodily demands or deficits which, in fact, may only coincidentally have self-preservative value. To reify as motive that which may well be a contingent by-product is as unwarranted as the claim of a purposeful perpetuation of the species on the basis of a mating or sex instinct.

Further, the will to live, unqualified, may easily be perverted into a pathological drive, an unfettered egoism destructive of the nobler social values. It is in this respect that Kurt Goldstein views the self-preservative drive as "essentially characteristic of a sick people," as symptomatic of "anomalous life, of the decay of life." While it may be that "sometimes the normal organism also tends primarily to avoid catastrophe...this takes place under inadequate conditions and is not at all usual behavior."²² Anticipating such difficulties, Kaplan has sought to argue that the self which is being preserved includes the higher "ideal self" of social values as well as the self of the vitalities. "The truth is," he writes, "that the will to live is bi-polar. It is as given to self-spending as to self- preservation."²³ By thus subsuming the socially imposed nature of the self under the single category of the preservation of self, Kaplan intends to avoid the embarrassment which confronted those Idealistic philosophers who formulated reasonably similar self- realization theories (Bosanquet, Green, Bradley, Royce). But some strength is sapped form the effort to make self-preservation stem from the original nature of the organism itself. There is a measure of truth in Mill's statement that "every respectable attribute of humanity is the result not of instinct but of the victory over instinct."²⁴

Even were there no question concerning the empirical status of these life urges, a major gap in the position would exist all the same. The empirically verified character of human nature in no way entails or guarantees agreement that human nature ought to be fulfilled. In any normative system there is a logical priority of value to fact. Were it established that a death instinct does in fact operate, it is doubtful that Kaplan would legitimate it as a normative base. Kaplan assigns a telic significance to the will to live and the will to self-realization, namely, that their purpose lies not simply in their fulfillment. That argument does not make the leap from the descriptive to the normative any the less unwarranted.

PRESUPPOSITION OF SOTERICS

Nevertheless, it would be regrettable were our difficulties with both the will to live and the will to maximum life to cause us to overlook the genuine contributions which soterics may make as a "common hypothetical method of achieving salvation," as Kaplan puts it. Recognizing the problems, it appears reasonable to suggest the abandonment of these "wills" treated as verified data, and their adoption as hypothetical outgrowths of a metaphysical substructure, the basic presuppositions of Kaplan's ethics and theology. This metaphysical substructure would contain at least three major presuppositions:

a. There exist certain universal biological, psychological and social needs and interest in man.

b. The integrated gratification of these needs and interests is a value;

c. The world is so salvation-conditioned as to enable their gratification.

Such metaphysical presuppositions are, of course, not subjects for verification in the scientific sense because the nature of these presuppositions has nothing to do with truth or falsity but rather with pragmatic efficacy. Unlike the unverifiable propositions of supernaturalism, they make no claim to ontological status. Their use is regulative and heuristic, not substantive and constitutive. They are subject to rejections should they not prove fruitful.

Soterical presuppositions may be vindicated on the same grounds as are the principles of induction or of the uniformity of nature made by science itself. It has more than once been pointed out that "all knowledge which on a basis of experience tells us something about what is not experienced is based upon a belief (an inductive principle) which experience cannot confirm or confute, yet which...appears to be a firmly rooted in us as many facts of experience."²⁵

Kaplan's claims understood as regulative invite several observations. First: Requisite for the construction of a universal ethics, "a kind of valuational Esperanto," is the recognition of certain universal needs (innate) and interests (acquired). This might well direct the attention of soterics to such well-accepted but simpler biological drives as hunger, sex, and thirst, and to such social-psychological interests as status and role-taking. The generalized formulations of the will to live and the will to maximum life would be considered hypotheses subject to further study. Investigation in this direction may also lead to a clearer understanding of the nature of the self, a basic category in the soterics of Kaplan; for the essence of value appears to be judged in terms of the activities and behavior contributory to the actualization of the self's natural tendencies. It is the self which experiences desires and impulses and seeks their satisfaction. It is the self which, in a manner of speaking, is also experienced, becoming an object unto itself, in that it evaluates the consequences of its behavior and organizes its value system. The self might be said, then, to contain the material, formal, final and efficient causes of its being. This is the distinctively humanistic element in soterics, portraying as it does the self as an active agent, an artist creating its salvation, in proper contrast with the passive role of the self which awaits other-world salvation.

Further study into this vital category is made necessary by soterics, since the self is so complex and multifunctional in nature. What is the proper balance in the assignment of value to the varying aspects of the self as both an egoistic and altruistic being?

Second, therefore, in stating that the source of value lies in the integrated satisfaction of the needs and interests of the organism, Kaplan proposes an indissoluble relationship between salvation and health. Physical and mental hygiene and the religious ethics of soterics are not related by analogy alone. What is healthful and what is moral are integrally related. With the successful advent of psychiatric therapy, that relationship between mental and moral hygiene has been reinforced. Many an unethical act is understood as a manifestation of illness, e.g. compulsive gamblers, sadists, alcoholics, psychopathic murderers, kleptomaniacs. These vices are now increasingly examined as illnesses. Murder and theft are evil but they are additionally understood in terms of their consequences for the total functioning organism. The penetration of psychiatry, its methods and therapy into the fields previously monopolized by abstract analyses or dogmatic theology is in keeping with the soterical emphasis on total (mental, physical, and moral) health as a central concern for personal salvation.

Third, the soterical presupposition of a salvation-conditioned universe so patterned as to contain the means of satisfying man's craving for self-realization elicits a natural piety towards those powers within the universe. Appreciation of the distinguishable powers for human salvation does not eliminate the reality of evil. It affirms not that Reality is good, but that goodness is real.²⁶ The "givenness" of societal and non-human environments which man takes as contributory to value denies the theological claim that the universe is essentially hostile to human ends. In the same spirit as Kaplan, Van der Leeuw extols the universe experiences as good by pointing to "water and trees, the fruit of the fields and beasts in the forest (as) bringers of salvation; the force issuing from their power transforms the gloom of life into joy and happiness...Culture too is 'salvation,' that is, a deed which is willed or volitional."²⁷

Kaplan refers to this presupposition as a soterical "inference" an acknowledged "willed faith" pragmatically understood. Much as adequacy, intersubjectivity and consistency serve to vindicate the inductive principle, so the purposes of salvation justify the sentiment that "man's cosmos is en rapport with the human will to salvation."²⁸ The moral optimism of such a salvation principle is, like the principle of induction, motivational and directive. It offers a structure of expectancies creating belief in the possibilities of human experience that serve to inspire people to achieve that end. This morale is intended to keep persons strong. Kaplan asserts that "insofar as the belief in God makes a difference in a person's life or in the life of a group, it must have consequences in the domain of effectiveness."²⁹ How can a working principle that sustains human endeavor, whether in science or religion, not incline us to interpret reality as somehow amenable to the aspirations of men?

MORALE IN RECONSTRUCTION

John Stuart Mill stated unequivocally the problematic in the naturalist's reconstruction of traditional supernaturalism: "It needs to be considered whether in order to obtain the effective morale resulting from supernaturalist faith, it is necessary to travel beyond the boundaries of the world which we inhabit; or whether the idealization of our earthly life, the cultivation of a high conception of what it may be made, is not capable of supplying a poetry, and in the best sense of the word a religion, equally fitted to exalt the feeling and, with the same aid from education, still better calculated to ennoble the conduct, than any belief respecting unseen powers."³⁰

Once a man is informed that faith in a salvational cosmos is an instrument which gains for us moral optimism and strengthens our hearts, does his awareness reduce the efficacy of prayer? Will anyone recite "geshem" (the prayer for rain) knowing full well that no palpable favors will ensue, that it may only serve to direct his feelings of gratitude to an indispensable natural force?

The religious naturalist must recognize the problem. It is too late for him to turn back and pretend that neither philosophy nor science has made its inroads. Those religious personalities committed to a naturalist position cannot afford the luxury of bemoaning the loss of a certain type of morale attendant on the supernaturalist's faith, the more so since many other consequences of such belief are entirely dysfunctional. The reconstructing naturalist needs rather invade new areas of morale and plan new interpretations of symbols and rites so as to compensate for the loss of comfort and ease afforded by facile conformity to convention. The observation of the sociologist, Robert Merton, is of interest in this respect: "Those functionalists who...attend only to the effects of such symbolic practices (rituals) upon the individual state of mind...neglect the fact that these very practices may on occasion take the place of more effective alternatives. And those theorists who refer to the indispensability of standardized practices or prevailing institutions because of their observed function in reinforcing common sentiments must look first to functional substitutes before arriving at a conclusion, more often premature than confirmed."³¹ It is towards such a fruitful direction that soterics impels us to explore.

In the midst of public religious apathy, in the sight of piece-meal emendations, false sentiments and half-truths, the religious naturalist needs base his morale on the wisdom of the past and the vision of a future. "The suns shines today also. There is more food and flax in the fields. There are new lands, new men, new thoughts, let us demand our own works and laws and worship."³²

(1) Milton Steinberg, "Theological Problems of the Hour," Rabbinical Assembly Proceedings, Rabbinical Assembly of America, New York 1949, p. 378.

(2) Milton Steinberg, The Common Sense of Religious Faith, (pamphlet), Jewish Reconstructionist Foundation, Inc., New York, 1947, p. 12.

(3) From an unpublished manuscript, by M. M. Kaplan, entitled The Art of Being Human.

(4) L. Feuerbach, quoted in H. Hoffding, History of Modern Philosophy, Macmillan, London, 1915, vol. II, p. 277.

(5) The Art of Being Human, manuscript, p. 60a.

(6) Ibid, p. 33.

(7) Plotinus, The Essence of Plotinus, Mackenna tr., Oxford University Press, New York, 1934, p. 49.

(8) Kurt Goldstein, The Organism, American Book Co., New York, 1939, p. 196.

(9) Karen Horney, Neurosis and Human Growth, W. W. Norton, New York, 1950, p. 15.

(10) Erich Fromm, Psycholanalysis and Religion, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1950, p. 74.

(11) Ibid. p. 20.

(12) Saos in Greek; salvus in Latin; heil in German. Interestingly, too, soteriology, in the study of hygiene, refers to laws of health.

(13) Paul Tillich, The Relation of Religion to Health, paper presented at University Seminar on Religion, Columbia University, 1945-6, p. 349.

(14) Lectures on the Ethics of T. H. Green, H. Spencer and J. Martineau, Macmillan, London, 1902, p. 64.

(15) Karen Horney, Neurosis and Human Growth, p. 348.

(16) M. M. Kaplan, The Art of Being Human, p. 112.

(17) M. M. Kaplan, "Towards a Philosophy of Cultural In-tegration," in Approaches to Group Understanding, ed. Bryson et al., Harper & Bros., New York, 1947, p. 603.

(18) M. M. Kaplan, "The Need for Normative Unity in Higher Education" in Goals for American Education, ed. Bryson et al., Harper & Bros., New York, 1950, p. 308.

(19) William James, Principles of Psychology, Henry Holt, New York, 1931, vol. II, p. 383.

(20) E. Fromm, Man For Himself, Harcourt, Brace & Co., New York, 1938, p. 13.

(21) Karl Menninger, Man Against Himself, Harcourt, Brace & Co., New York, 1938, p. 13.

(22) Muzafer Sherif, An Outline of Social Psychology, Harper & Bros., New York, 1948, p. 20.

(23) Kurt Goldstein, The Organism, p. 197.

(24) M. M. Kaplan, The Need for Normative Unity, p. 312.

(25) John Stuart Mill, "Essay on Nature," in Three Essays on Religion, Henry Holt, New York, 1874, p. 46.

(26) Bertrand Russell, Problems of Philosophy, Oxford University Press, 1948, p. 69.

(27) All the more puzzling is Henry Wieman's claim that Dr. Kaplan identifies the universe with God or goodness and is thus "forced to defend his belief in the goodness of the universe against the facts of evil." Review of Religion, XIV, no. 1.

(28) G. Van der Leeuw, Religion in Essence and in Manifestation, Allen and Unwin, London, 1938, pp. 101, 104.

(29) M. M. Kaplan, The Future of the American Jew, Macmillan, New York, 1948, p. 193.

(30) M. M. Kaplan, The Art of Being Human, p. 75.

(31) J. S. Mill, "The Utility of Religion," in Three Essays On Religion, p. 105.

(32) Robert Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, Free Press, Glencoe, Ill., 1949, p. 37.

(33) Ralph Waldo Emerson, quoted in Morris R. Cohen's A Dreamer's Journey, Beacon Press, Boston, 1949, p. 180.

* This document, or any portion thereof, may not be reproduced without the written permission of the author.